Strategic Deterrence (SD) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) Version 2.0

New and Improved!

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“The major deterrent [to war] is in a man’s mind. The major deterrent in the future is going to be not only what we have, but what we do, what we are willing to do, what they think we will do. Stamina, guts, standing up for the things we say – those are deterrents.”

Admiral Arleigh Burke, 3 October 1960

As quoted in U.S. News and World Report

A vision for Full-Spectrum Strategic Deterrence

Overview

- How we got here
- What we expect will not change in V2.0
- What we expect will change in V2.0

How we got here

int Operating Concepts (JOC

“New” Strategic Deterrence now reflected across:
- **Joint Doctrine**
- **DoD policy documents**
- **Other JCIDS documents**

Initial Joint Operating Concept

- **Major Combat Ops - JFCOM**
- **Stability Ops - JFCOM**
- **Homeland Security - NORTHCOM**
- **Strategic Deterrence - STRATCOM**



Available online at http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision

Strategic Deterrence JOC V1.0 Approved by SECDEF in October 2004 – Rewrite due in Feb 06 (informed by new Capstone Concept for Joint Ops)

CCJO Overarching Approach

- **The joint force, in concert with other elements of national and multinational power, will conduct integrated, tempo-controlling actions in multiple domains concurrently to dominate any adversary and help control any situation in support of strategic objectives.**
- **The framework used in the CCJO treats all situations (adversary and non-adversary) as complex, adaptive systems that are the product of the dynamic interactions between connected elements and processes. Because of interconnectedness, no element or process of the system can be considered only in isolation; no apt**
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

SD JOC is compatible with the CCJO approach

The Landscape And Our Threat Focus Has Changed

Deterrence in Cold War
- **Single threat (USSR/Warsaw Pact)**
- **Assured destruction strategy**
- **Reliance upon large nuclear arsenal and forward-based conventional forces**

Deterrence today
- **Complex range of asymmetric actors with varying risk-taking propensities**
- **Proliferation of technologies**
- **<u>Cannot</u> rely on a one-size-fits-all approach**
- **Individually shaped strategies**
- **Layered "systems" methodology**
- **Spectrum of warfighting and non-**

Comparing the "Old" and "New" Strategic Deterrence

	Adversary Focus	Grand National Strategy	Stressing Scenario	Tools for Deterrence Abroad	Linkage to "Central" Deterrence	Deterrence Effectiveness Assessment
Cold-War Strategic Deterrence	Soviet Union & Warsaw Pact	Containment	Defense of Western Europe	"Conventional" Deterrence by in-place forces (Deterrence by Denial) Extended (nuclear) Deterrence	Nuclear Triad (Deterrence by Punishment / Assured Destruction)	Force Structure Sizing Game Theory
21st Century Strategic Deterrence (SD JOC approach)	Various State & Non-state Actors	(No good name yet) Variegated strategy with elements of: Engagement / Enlargement Preemption / Rollback Assurance / Dissuasion	Indeterminate	Global Force Management	New Triad (Deterrence by Denying Benefits, Imposing Costs, Inducing Restraint)	Holistic Analysis

What we expect <u>will not</u> change in V2.0

What We Expect Will Not Change

- **Approach (decisive influence) & definitions**
- **Scope (emphasizing national military capabilities)**
- **Three “ways” (Deterrence by Denying Benefits, Imposing Costs, Inducing Restraint)**
- **U.S. deterrent COAs tailored by specific adversary, scenario, and U.S. vital interests impacted**
- **Deliberate deterrence planning that is globally integrated, synchronized, deconflicted, and continually assessed**

Strategic Deterrence Defined (SD JOC V1.0, pg. 4)

<u>Strategic Deterrence</u>--The prevention of adversary aggression or coercion that threatens vital interests of the United States and/or our national survival. Strategic deterrence convinces adversaries not to take grievous courses of action by means of decisive influence over their decision making.

- **Enduring vital interests include:**
  - **Maintaining the integrity of U.S. territory**
  - **Preventing mass casualties at home and abroad**
  - **Protecting critical U.S. and international infrastructures (energy, telecommunications, water, essential services, etc.) that support our basic standard of living and economic viability**
  - **Promoting democracy and free trade, and supporting the defense of U.S. allies**

Key Points (unchanged)

- **Strategic refers to the nature of the threat to U.S. vital interests**
  - **'Strategic' not a synonym for 'nuclear'—but nuclear is still important**
  - **Capabilities required are directly tied to the military problem**
- **Deterrence is a function of adversary perceptions**
  - **"Adversary's perception is reality"**
  - **Must influence adversary decision making consistent with U.S. aims**
- **Strategic deterrence must be integrated with an overarching National strategy**
  - **DoD efforts must be synchronized with a National plan and the efforts of our allied/coalition partners**
- **JOCs are a key part of the 2004 National Military Strategy**
  - **JOCs are Joint Force concepts—applicable to all in DoD**
  - **The capabilities needed impact multiple combatant commanders and require cross-DoD and interagency coordination**

Synopsis of the Central Idea (unchanged)

- **Deterrence by Imposing Costs**
  - **“Traditional” view of deterrence**
  - **Achieved through both offensive and defensive capabilities**
- **Deterrence by Denying Benefits**
  - **Credible threat to deny adversary’s strategic objectives**
  - **Achieved through both offensive and defensive capabilities**
  - **Especially important when stakes are asymmetric**
- **Deterrence by Inducing Adversary Restraint**
  - **Convince adversary that being deterred is his best option**
    - **e.g., exercise purposeful U.S. restraint, provide improved situation awareness**

“Adversary’s perception <u>is</u> reality”

Adversary Decision Calculus (SD JOC View)

SD JOC V2.0 will explain the "teeter-totter" in detail



Adversary's perceived benefits are weighed against potential costs in the context of his consequences of no action (fulcrum)

Adversary Decision Calculus



Deterrence Strategy

Successful deterrence is maintained by countering an adversary's perceived benefits with credible costs or by denying the adversary benefits that may have been gained. The U.S. can also induce adversary restraint by

Synopsis of the Central Idea (unchanged)

MEANS	WAYS	END

STRATEGIC DETERRENCE

Necessary Joint Force Capabilities (unchanged)

- **Capabilities (and associated attributes) are "means" of Strategic Deterrence JOC**

Enabling Means

- **Global Situational Awareness**
- **Command and Control**
- **Overseas Presence**
- **Allied/Coalition Military Cooperation & Integration**

Direct Means

- **Force Projection**
- **Nuclear Strike Capabilities**
- **Active and Passive Defenses**
- **Global Strike**
- **Strategic Deterrence Information Operations**
- **Inducement Operations**
- **Space Control**

Deterrence Effectiveness Assessment (updated)

- **Adversary's thoughts not easily "measured" - results in subjective assessment of SD operations**
  - **Deterrence success often marked by "inaction" - result may not be directly attributable to deterrence efforts**
  - **Success may not be realized in "real-time"**

- **Deterrence Effectiveness Assessment is a two-part process**
  - **First step: Adversary Decision Calculus Assessment**
  - **Second step: Assess Deterrence Impact**

- **Requires long-term assessment effort**
  - **STRATCOM currently standing up this capability – SDAL prototype began 1 Apr 05**
  - **Informed by joint experimentation (e.g., Unified Quest 05)**

What we expect will change in V2.0

What We Expect Will Change

- Expand current discussion on deterring non-state actors
- Provide a lead-in for future JOC “case” development
- Institutionalizing the SD JOC concept
  - Deliberate (adaptive) deterrence planning
  - New Triad integration
- Harmonizing with other JOCs (e.g., Homeland Security)
- Expanding DIME integration

Deterrence & Influence in the GWOT*

- **Deterrence does not have an "on-off" switch**
  - **Must take systems-approach to AQ and other groups**
  - **Conduct a "broad front" strategy**
  - **AQ is very concerned with control, operational risks, and perceptions of whether they are winning or losing**
- **There is no "single type" of terrorist**
  - **Must be adversary/scenario specific as much as possible to avoid "mirror-imaging" trap**
- **Deterrence and Eradication don't fit together easily**
- **Influence activities require improved capabilities for rapid, centralized decision-making and timely, adaptive distributed actions**

*Deterrence & Influence in Counterterroris
A Component in the War on al Qaeda
(Davis/Jenkins, RAND 2002)

Deterrence & Influence in the GWOT (cont.)

- **Religious terrorists (e.g., AQ) deterrable in theory**
  - **Meet SD JOC rationality criterion (purposeful decision-making)**
- **It is difficult to impose costs on terrorists with "no return address," who don't fear death, *but*:**
  - **Some costs can be imposed (esp. on "soft" support)**
  - **Not all religious terrorists eager to be martyred (esp. leaders)**
- **More severe problems constrain strategic deterrence as a cornerstone GWOT activity**
  - **Perception of consequences of restraint—current GWOT perceived as a struggle between absolute good and evil**
  - **Fought over ultimate stakes in the "here and now"**
  - **Martyrdom not viewed as a cost, but as a greater benefit**

Institutionalizing Strategic Deterrence

- **Deterrent Options** — A course of action, developed on the best economic, diplomatic, political, and military judgment, designed to dissuade an adversary from a current course of action or contemplated operations. (In constructing an operation plan, a range of options should be presented to effect deterrence. Each option requiring deployment of forces should be a separate force module.) (current JP 1-02 definition)

Issues with current Flexible Deterrent Options

- *Crisis-focused (i.e., "dust-off only when alarm sounds")*
- *Subordinate to Deliberate Plan construction*
- *"C*

SD JOC will expand on FDO development – establishing viability & relevance to specific situations

Strategic Deterrence Assessment Lab (SDAL)

The Strategic Deterrence Joint Operating Concept (SD JOC), Feb 2004 (Final Draft), establishes the requirement for the SDAL:

"Effective implementation of this approach to metrics and experimentation will require a dedicated, long-term assessment effort. Establishment of a 'Strategic Deterrence Assessment Lab' would focus DoD activities and create a national asset for strategic deterrence effectiveness assessment. This would aid in the continued development of strategic deterrence joint operating concepts and strategies. The results of these assessments would be folded into JFC deliberate planning and support rapid development of suggested courses of action in crisis action planning."

- **Establish dedicated, long-term capability with a national fo**
  - **Aid deliberate planning**
  - **Support rapid COA development in crisis planning**
  - **Aid concept and strategy development**

SD JOC will discuss SDAL efforts to date

Example SDAL Deliverables

- **Identify Likely Adversary COAs of interest**
  - **Adversary perceptions of key benefits**
  - **Adversary perceptions of key costs**
  - **Adversary perceptions of consequences of restraint**
  - **Critical factors impacting adversary decision making**
- **Identify Potential High-leverage actions**

Action Impact Matrices (example)



An unclassified illustration of the current "state-of-the-art"

From: Deterring Chemical Weapons Use by Usamah bin Laden:
A Deterrence Framework Assessment (Unclassified)

Prepared for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Mr. Greg Weaver, Science Applications International Corp.

2 November 1999

CW Calculus Summary (Example): Benefits

- 4 Very High (VH) value benefits
  - All directly involve US will to suffer casualties
  - 2 are VH probability in the long term
  - None less than Moderate probability
- 4 High value benefits with High probability
  - All serve to further achievement of VH value long term objectives
- Chemical weapons use seen as very beneficial
  - Especially in the long run

Critical Factors Influencing Calculus (ex.)

- **Believe US does not merit “moral” treatment**
  - **US already attacking Muslim “innocents”**
  - **Attacks on US civilians thus OK, proportional**
- **Uncertainty re: nature of initial US response**
  - **Retreat or Rage?**
  - **US government vs. US public?**
- **Confidence in US long term response: Retreat**
  - **US weak when face w/severe casualties inflicted by persevering enemy**
  - **Attacks on US civilians will aid/accelerate this result**

Consequences of Restraint (example)

- **Consequences of restraint already “escalated”**
  - **Unacceptable costs being incurred right now**
- **US presence remains in Islamic Holy Land**
  - **Saudi, Gulf regimes remains in power**
- **Israel continues to occupy Jerusalem**
- **Conventional attacks may not exceed US threshold**
  - **Continually improving defenses, possibly offense**
  - **May take considerably longer to achieve goals**
- **Serious: Threat to success, but urgency uncertain**

Potential High Leverage Actions (example)

- **Increased pressure on/action against sanctuary state(s)**
- **Enhanced CW defense of US targets**
- **Improved intelligence, especially HUMINT**
  - **All favorably affect wide range of Cost values and Benefit and Cost probabilities**
- **Note: Retaliation vs. UBL <u>not</u> high leverage**
  - **Useful in defense, but not as a deterrent**

Notional Planning Flow Model (front-end)



Applying the SD JOC approach to adaptive planning

Planning Flow Model
(Plan & Option Development)



Decision Calculus Assessment links Analysis to Operational Planning/Implementation – Institutionalizes process within DoD

New Triad/SD JOC/Policy Goals Linkage

- The New Triad is at the center of DoD's strategic deterrence efforts
- Strategic Deterrence is central to our ability to implement DoD defense policy goals regionally--assure, dissuade, deter (forward), and defeat
- The Strategic Deterrence "ways" (Impose Costs, Deny Benefits, Induce Restraint) link New Triad capabilities to regional and trans-regional U.S. security planning



Harmonizing with other JOCs



Figure ES-2: DOD HLS JOC Strategic Concept

Expanding DIME Integration

How do we do this better as a nation (strategic deterrence as a national approach)?



Summary

- How we got here
- What we expect will not change in V2.0
- What we expect will change in V2.0

Questions?

Backup Slides